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Abstract. In this paper we explore a unifying approach — that of hypotheses assumption — as a
means to provide a semantics for all Normal Logic Programs (NLPs), the Minimal Hypotheses (MH)
semantics 1. This semantics takes a positive hypotheses assumption approach as a means to guarantee
the desirable properties of model existence, relevance and cumulativity, and of generalizing the Sta-
ble Models semantics in the process. To do so we first introduce the fundamental semantic concept
of minimality of assumed positive hypotheses, define the MH semantics, and analyze the semantics’
properties and applicability. Indeed, abductive Logic Programming can be conceptually captured by a
strategy centered on the assumption of abducibles (or hypotheses). Likewise, the Argumentation per-
spective of Logic Programs (e.g. [7]) also lends itself to an arguments (or hypotheses) assumption
approach. Previous works on Abduction (e.g. [12]) have depicted the atoms of default negated literals
in NLPs as abducibles, i.e., assumable hypotheses. We take a complementary and more general view
than these works to NLP semantics by employing positive hypotheses instead.
Keywords: Hypotheses, Semantics, NLPs, Abduction, Argumentation.
1 Background
Logic Programs have long been used in Knowledge Representation and Reasoning.
Definition 1. Normal Logic Program. By an alphabet A of a language L we mean (finite or countably
infinite) disjoint sets of constants, predicate symbols, and function symbols, with at least one constant. In
addition, any alphabet is assumed to contain a countably infinite set of distinguished variable symbols. A
term overA is defined recursively as either a variable, a constant or an expression of the form f(t1, . . . , tn)
where f is a function symbol of A, n its arity, and the ti are terms. An atom over A is an expression of the
form P (t1, . . . , tn) where P is a predicate symbol of A, and the ti are terms. A literal is either an atom A
or its default negation not A. We dub default literals (or default negated literals — DNLs, for short) those
of the form not A. A term (resp. atom, literal) is said ground if it does not contain variables. The set of all
ground terms (resp. atoms) of A is called the Herbrand universe (resp. base) of A. For short we use H to
denote the Herbrand base of A. A Normal Logic Program (NLP) is a possibly infinite set of rules (with no
infinite descending chains of syntactical dependency) of the form
H ← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm, (with m,n ≥ 0 and finite)
where H , the Bi and the Cj are atoms, and each rule stands for all its ground instances. In conformity
with the standard convention, we write rules of the form H ← also simply as H (known as “facts”). An
NLP P is called definite if none of its rules contain default literals. H is the head of the rule r, denoted by
head(r), and body(r) denotes the set {B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm} of all the literals in the body of
r.
When doing problem modelling with logic programs, rules of the form
⊥ ← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm, (with m,n ≥ 0 and finite)
1 This paper is a very condensed summary of some of the main contributions of the PhD Thesis [19] of the first author,
supported by FCT-MCTES grant SFRH / BD / 28761 / 2006, and supervised by the second author.
with a non-empty body are known as a type of Integrity Constraints (ICs), specifically denials, and they are
normally used to prune out unwanted candidate solutions. We abuse the ‘not ’ default negation notation
applying it to non-empty sets of literals too: we write not S to denote {not s : s ∈ S}, and confound
not not a ≡ a. When S is an arbitrary, non-empty set of literals S = {B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm}
we use
– S+ denotes the set {B1, . . . , Bn} of positive literals in S
– S− denotes the set {not C1, . . . , not Cm} of negative literals in S
– |S| = S+ ∪ (not S−) denotes the set {B1, . . . , Bn, C1, . . . , Cm} of atoms of S
As expected, we say a set of literals S is consistent iff S+ ∩ |S−| = ∅. We also write heads(P ) to denote
the set of heads of non-IC rules of a (possibly constrained) program P , i.e., heads(P ) = {head(r) : r ∈
P}\{⊥}, and facts(P ) to denote the set of facts of P — facts(P ) = {head(r) : r ∈ P ∧ body(r) = ∅}.
Definition 2. Part of body of a rule not in loop. Let P be an NLP and r a rule of P . We write body(r)
to denote the subset of body(r) whose atoms do not depend on r. Formally, body(r) is the largest set of
literals such that
body(r) ⊆ body(r) ∧ ∀
a∈|body(r)|∄ra∈P (head(ra) = a ∧ ra և r)
where ra և r means rule ra depends on rule r, i.e., either head(r) ∈ |body(ra)| or there is some other
rule r′ ∈ P such that ra և r′ and head(r) ∈ |body(r′)|.
Definition 3. Layer Supported and Classically supported interpretations. We say an interpretation I of
an NLP P is layer (classically) supported iff every atom a of I is layer (classically) supported in I . a is
layer (classically) supported in I iff there is some rule r in P with head(r) = a such that I |= body(r)
(I |= body(r)). Likewise, we say the rule r is layer (classically) supported in I iff I |= body(r) (I |=
body(r)).
Literals in body(r) are, by definition, not in loop with r. The notion of layered support requires that all
such literals be true under I in order for head(r) to be layer supported in I . Hence, if body(r) is empty,
head(r) is ipso facto layer supported.
Proposition 1. Classical Support implies Layered Support. Given a NLP P , an interpretation I , and an
atom a such that a ∈ I , if a is classically supported in I then a is also layer supported in I .
Proof. Knowing that, by definition, body(r) ⊆ body(r) for every rule r, it follows trivially that a is layer
supported in I if a is classically supported in I . ⊓⊔
2 Motivation
“Why the need for another 2-valued semantics for NLPs since we already have the Stable Models one?” The
question has its merit since the Stable Models (SMs) semantics [9] is exactly what is necessary for so many
problem solving issues, but the answer to it is best understood when we ask it the other way around: “Is
there any situation where the SMs semantics does not provide all the intended models?” and “Is there any
2-valued generalization of SMs that keeps the intended models it does provide, adds the missing intended
ones, and also enjoys the useful properties of guarantee of model existence, relevance, and cumulativity?”
Example 1. A Joint Vacation Problem — Merging Logic Programs. Three friends are planning a joint
vacation. First friend says “If we don’t go to the mountains, then we should go to the beach”. The second
friend says “If we don’t go to travelling, then we should go to the mountains”. The third friend says “If we
don’t go to the beach, then we should go travelling”. We code this information as the following NLP:
beach← not mountain
mountain← not travel
travel ← not beach
Each of these individual consistent rules come from a different friend. According to the SMs, each friend
had a “solution” (a SM) for his own rule, but when we put the three rules together, because they form an
odd loop over negation (OLON), the resulting merged logic program has no SM. If we assume beach is
true then we cannot conclude travel and therefore we conclude mountain is also true — this gives rise
to the {beach,mountain, not travel} joint and multi-place vacation solution. The other (symmetric) two
are {mountain, not beach, travel} and {travel, not mountain,
beach}. This example too shows the importance of having a 2-valued semantics guaranteeing model exis-
tence, in this case for the sake of arbitrary merging of logic programs (and for the sake of existence of a
joint vacation for these three friends).
Increased Declarativity. An IC is a rule whose head is ⊥, and although such syntactical definition of
IC is generally accepted as standard, the SM semantics can employ odd loops over negation, such as
the a ← not a,X to act as ICs, thereby mixing and unnecessarily confounding two distinct Knowledge
Representation issues: the one of IC use, and the one of assigning semantics to loops. For the sake of
declarativity, rules with ⊥ head should be the only way to write ICs in a LP: no rule, or combination of
rules, with head different from ⊥ should possibly act as IC(s) under any given semantics. It is commonly
argued that answer sets (or stable models) of a program correspond to the solutions of the corresponding
problem, so no answer set means no solution. We argue against this position: “normal” logic rules (i.e.,
non-ICs) should be used to shape the candidate-solution space, whereas ICs, and ICs alone, should be
allowed to play the role of cutting down the undesired candidate-solutions. In this regard, an IC-free NLP
should always have a model; if some problem modelled as an NLP with ICs has no solution (i.e., no model)
that should be due only to the ICs, not to the “normal” rules.
Argumentation From an argumentation perspective, the author of [7], states:
“Stable extensions do not capture the intuitive semantics of every meaningful argumentation
system.”
where the “stable extensions” have a 1-to-1 correspondence to the SMs ([7]), and also
“Let P be a knowledge base represented either as a logic program, or as a nonmonotonic
theory or as an argumentation framework. Then there is not necessarily a “bug” in P if P has no
stable semantics.
This theorem defeats an often held opinion in the logic programming and nonmonotonic rea-
soning community that if a logic program or a nonmonotonic theory has no stable semantics then
there is something “wrong” in it.”
Thus, a criterion different from the stability one must be used in order to effectively model every argumen-
tation framework adequately.
Arbitrary Updates and/or Merges One of the main goals behind the conception of non-monotonic logics
was the ability to deal with the changing, evolving, updating of knowledge. There are scenarios where it is
possible and useful to combine several Knowledge Bases (possibly from different authors or sources) into
a single one, and/or to update a given KB with new knowledge. Assuming the KBs are coded as IC-free
NLPs, as well as the updates, the resulting KB is also an IC-free NLP. In such a case, the resulting (merged
and/or updated) KB should always have a semantics. This should be true particularly in the case of NLPs
where no negations are allowed in the heads of rules. In this case no contradictions can arise because there
are no conflicting rule heads. The lack of such guarantee when the underlying semantics used is the Stable
Models, for example, compromises the possibility of arbitrarily updating and/or merging KBs (coded as
IC-free NLPs). In the case of self-updating programs, the desirable “liveness” property is put into question,
even without outside intervention.
These motivational issues raise the questions “Which should be the 2-valued models of an NLP when
it has no SMs?”, “How do these relate to SMs?”, “Is there a uniform approach to characterize both such
models and the SMs?”, and “Is there any 2-valued generalization of the SMs that encompasses the intuitive
semantics of every logic program?”. Answering such questions is a paramount motivation and thrust in this
paper.
2.1 Intuitively Desired Semantics
It is commonly accepted that the non-stratification of the default not is the fundamental ingredient which
allows for the possibility of existence of several models for a program. The non-stratified DNLs (i.e., in a
loop) of a program can thus be seen as non-deterministically assumable choices. The rules in the program,
as well as the particular semantics we wish to assign them, is what constrains which sets of those choices
we take as acceptable. Programs with OLONs (ex. 1) are said to be “contradictory” by the SMs community
because the latter takes a negative hypotheses assumption approach, consistently maximizing them, i.e.,
DNLs are seen as assumable/abducible hypotheses. In ex.1 though, assuming whichever maximal negative
hypotheses leads to a positive contradictory conclusion via the rules. On the other hand, if we take a
consistent minimal positive hypotheses assumption (where the assumed hypotheses are the atoms of the
DNLs), then it is impossible to achieve a contradiction since no negative conclusions can be drawn from
NLP rules. Minimizing positive assumptions implies the maximizing of negative ones but gaining an extra
degree of freedom.
2.2 Desirable Formal Properties
Only ICs (rules with⊥ head) should “endanger” model existence in a logic program. Therefore, a semantics
for NLPs with no ICs should guarantee model existence (which, e.g., does not occur with SMs). Relevance
is also a useful property since it allows the development of top-down query-driven proof-procedures that
allow for the sound and complete search for answers to a user’s query. This is useful in the sense that
in order to find an answer to a query only the relevant part of the program must be considered, whereas
with a non-relevant semantics the whole program must be considered, with corresponding performance
disadvantage compared to a relevant semantics.
Definition 4. Relevant part of P for atom a. The relevant part of NLP P for atom a is
RelP (a) = {ra ∈ P : head(ra) = a} ∪ {r ∈ P : ∃ra∈P∧head(ra)=ara և r}
Definition 5. Relevance (adapted from [5]). A semantics Sem for logic programs is said Relevant iff for
every program P
∀a∈HP (∀M∈ModelsSem(P )a ∈M)⇔ (∀Ma∈ModelsSem(RelP (a))a ∈Ma)
Moreover, cumulativity also plays a role in performance enhancement in the sense that only a semantics
enjoying this property can take advantage of storing intermediate lemmas to speed up future computations.
Definition 6. Cumulativity (adapted from [4]). Let P be an NLP, and a, b two atoms ofHP . A semantics
Sem is Cumulative iff the semantics of P remains unchanged when any atom true in the semantics is added
to P as a fact:
∀a,b∈HP
(
(∀M∈ModelsSem(P )a ∈M)⇒
(∀M∈ModelsSem(P )b ∈M ⇔ ∀Ma∈ModelsSem(P∪{a})b ∈Ma)
)
Finally, each individual SM of a program, by being minimal and classically supported, should be accepted
as a model according to every 2-valued semantics, and hence every 2-valued semantics should be a model
conservative extension of Stable Models.
3 Syntactic Transformations
It is commonly accepted that definite LPs (i.e., without default negation) have only one 2-valued model —
its least model which coincides with the Well-Founded Model (WFM [8]). This is also the case for locally
stratified LPs. In such cases we can use a syntactic transformation on a program to obtain that model. In [2]
the author defined the program Remainder (denoted by P̂ ) for calculating the WFM, which coincides with
the unique perfect model for locally stratified LPs. The Remainder can thus be seen as a generalization
for NLPs of the lfp(T ), the latter obtainable only from the subclass of definite LPs. We recap here the
definitions necessary for the Remainder because we will use it in the definition of our Minimal Hypotheses
semantics. The intuitive gist of MH semantics (formally defined in section 4) is as follows: an interpretation
MH is a MH model of program P iff there is some minimal set of hypotheses H such that the truth-values
of all atoms of P become determined assuming the atoms in H as true. We resort to the program Remainder
as a deterministic (and efficient, i.e., computable in polynomial time) means to find out if the truth-values
of all literals became determined or not — we will see below how the Remainder can be used to find this
out.
3.1 Program Remainder
For self-containment, we include here the definitions of [2] upon which the Remainder relies, and adapt
them where convenient to better match the syntactic conventions used throughout this paper.
Definition 7. Program transformation (def. 4.2 of [2]). A program transformation is a relation 7→ between
ground logic programs. A semantics S allows a transformation 7→ iff ModelsS(P1) = ModelsS(P2) for
all P1 and P2 with P1 7→ P2. We write 7→∗ to denote the fixed point of the 7→ operation, i.e., P 7→∗ P ′
where ∄P ′′ 6=P ′P ′ 7→ P ′′. It follows that P 7→∗ P ′ ⇒ P ′ 7→ P ′.
Definition 8. Positive reduction (def. 4.6 of [2]). Let P1 and P2 be ground programs. Program P2 results
from P1 by positive reduction (P1 7→P P2) iff there is a rule r ∈ P1 and a negative literal not b ∈ body(r)
such that b /∈ heads(P1), i.e., there is no rule for b in P1, and P2 = (P1 \ {r}) ∪ {head(r)← (body(r) \
{not b})}.
Definition 9. Negative reduction (def. 4.7 of [2]). Let P1 and P2 be ground programs. Program P2 results
from P1 by negative reduction (P1 7→N P2) iff there is a rule r ∈ P1 and a negative literal not b ∈ body(r)
such that b ∈ facts(P1), i.e., b appears as a fact in P1, and P2 = P1 \ {r}.
Negative reduction is consistent with classical support, but not with the layered one. Therefore, we intro-
duce now a layered version of the negative reduction operation.
Definition 10. Layered negative reduction. Let P1 and P2 be ground programs. Program P2 results
from P1 by layered negative reduction (P1 7→LN P2) iff there is a rule r ∈ P1 and a negative literal
not b ∈ body(r) such that b ∈ facts(P1), i.e., b appears as a fact in P1, and P2 = P1 \ {r}.
The Strongly Connected Components (SCCs) of rules of a program can be calculated in polynomial time
[20]. Once the SCCs of rules have been identified, the body(r) subset of body(r), for each rule r, is
identifiable in linear time — one needs to check just once for each literal in body(r) if it is also in body(r).
Therefore, these polynomial time complexity operations are all the added complexity Layered negative
reduction adds over regular Negative reduction.
Definition 11. Success (def. 5.2 of [2]). Let P1 and P2 be ground programs. Program P2 results from P1
by success (P1 7→S P2) iff there are a rule r ∈ P1 and a fact b ∈ facts(P1) such that b ∈ body(r), and
P2 = (P1 \ {r}) ∪ {head(r)← (body(r) \ {b})}.
Definition 12. Failure (def. 5.3 of [2]). Let P1 andP2 be ground programs. ProgramP2 results from P1 by
failure (P1 7→F P2) iff there are a rule r ∈ P1 and a positive literal b ∈ body(r) such that b /∈ heads(P1),
i.e., there are no rules for b in P1, and P2 = P1 \ {r}.
Definition 13. Loop detection (def. 5.10 of [2]). Let P1 and P2 be ground programs. Program P2 results
from P1 by loop detection (P1 7→L P2) iff there is a set A of ground atoms such that
1. for each rule r ∈ P1, if head(r) ∈ A, then body(r) ∩ A 6= ∅,
2. P2 := {r ∈ P1|body(r) ∩ A = ∅},
3. P1 6= P2.
We are not entering here into the details of the loop detection step, but just taking note that 1) such a set
A corresponds to an unfounded set (cf. [8]); 2) loop detection is computationally equivalent to finding the
SCCs [20], and is known to be of polynomial time complexity; and 3) the atoms in the unfounded set A
have all their corresponding rules involved in SCCs where all heads of rules in loop appear positive in the
bodies of the rules in loop.
Definition 14. Reduction (def. 5.15 of [2]).
Let 7→X denote the rewriting system: 7→X := 7→P ∪ 7→N ∪ 7→S ∪ 7→F ∪ 7→L.
Definition 15. Layered reduction.
Let 7→LX denote the rewriting system: 7→LX := 7→P ∪ 7→LN ∪ 7→S ∪ 7→F ∪ 7→L.
Definition 16. Remainder (def. 5.17 of [2]). Let P be a program. Let P̂ satisfy
ground(P ) 7→∗X P̂ . Then P̂ is called the remainder of P , and is guaranteed to exist and to be unique to
P . Moreover, the calculus of 7→∗X is known to be of polynomial time complexity [2]. When convenient, we
write Rem(P ) instead of P̂ .
An important result from [2] is that the WFM of P is such that WFM+(P ) = facts(P̂ ), WFM+u =
heads(P̂ ), andWFM−(P ) = HP \WFM+u(P ), whereWFM+(P ) denotes the set of atoms of P true
in the WFM, WFM+u(P ) denotes the set of atoms of P true or undefined in the WFM, and WFM−(P )
denotes the set of atoms of P false in the WFM.
Definition 17. Layered Remainder. Let P be a program. Let the program P˚ satisfy ground(P ) 7→∗LX P˚ .
Then P˚ is called a layered remainder of P . Since P˚ is equivalent to P̂ , apart from the difference between
7→LN and 7→N , it is trivial that P˚ is also guaranteed to exist and to be unique for P . Moreover, the calculus
of 7→∗LX is likewise of polynomial time complexity because 7→LN is also of polynomial time complexity.
The remainder’s rewrite rules are provably confluent, ie. independent of application order. The layered
remainder’s rules differ only in the negative reduction rule and the confluence proof of the former is readily
adapted to the latter.
Example 2. P˚ versus P̂ . Recall the program from example 1 but now with an additional fourth stubborn
friend who insists on going to the beach no matter what. P =
beach← not mountain
mountain← not travel
travel ← not beach
beach
We can clearly see that the single fact rule does not depend on any other, and that the remaining three rules
forming the loop all depend on each other and on the fact rule beach. P̂ is the fixed point of 7→X , i.e., the
fixed point of 7→P ∪ 7→N ∪ 7→S ∪ 7→F ∪ 7→L. Since beach is a fact, the 7→N transformation deletes the
travel ← not beach rule; i.e., P 7→N P ′ is such that
P ′ = {beach← not mountain mountain← not travel beach←}
Now in P ′ there are no rules for travel and hence we can apply the 7→P transformation which deletes
the not travel from the body of mountain’s rule; i.e, P ′ 7→P P ′′ where P ′′ = {beach← not mountain
mountain← beach←}
Finally, in P ′′ mountain is a fact and hence we can again apply the 7→N obtaining P ′′ 7→P P ′′′ where
P ′′′ = {mountain ← beach ←} upon which no more transformations can be applied, so P̂ = P ′′′.
Instead, P˚ = P is the fixed point of 7→LX , i.e., the fixed point of 7→P ∪ 7→LN ∪ 7→S ∪ 7→F ∪ 7→L.
4 Minimal Hypotheses Semantics
4.1 Choosing Hypotheses
The abductive perspective of [12] depicts the atoms of DNLs as abducibles, i.e., assumable hypotheses.
Atoms of DNLs can be considered as abducibles, i.e., assumable hypotheses, but not all of them. When
we have a locally stratified program we cannot really say there is any degree of freedom in assuming truth
values for the atoms of the program’s DNLs. So, we realize that only the atoms of DNLs involved in SCCs2
are eligible to be considered further assumable hypotheses.
2 Strongly Connected Components, as in Examples 1 and 2
Both the SMs and the approach of [12], when taking the abductive perspective, adopt negative hy-
potheses only. This approach works fine for some instances of non-well-founded negation such as loops
(in particular, for even loops over negation like this one), but not for odd loops over negation like, e.g.
a ← not a: assuming not a would lead to the conclusion that a is true which contradicts the initial as-
sumption. To overcome this problem, we generalized the hypotheses assumption perspective to allow the
adoption, not only of negative hypotheses, but also of positive ones. Having taken this generalization step
we realized that positive hypotheses assumption alone is sufficient to address all situations, i.e., there is
no need for both positive and negative hypotheses assumption. Indeed, because we minimize the positive
hypotheses we are with one stroke maximizing the negative ones, which has been the traditional way of
dealing with the CWA, and also with stable models because the latter’s requirement of classical support
minimizes models.
In example 1 we saw three solutions, each assuming as true one of the DNLs in the loop. Adding a
fourth stubborn friend insisting on going to the beach, as in example 2, should still permit the two solutions
{beach,mountain, not travel} and {travel, not mountain, beach}. The only way to permit both these
solutions is by resorting to the Layered Remainder, and not to the Remainder, as a means to identify the set
of assumable hypotheses.
Thus, all the literals of P that are not determined false in P˚ are candidates for the role of hypotheses
we may consider to assume as true. Merging this perspective with the abductive perspective of [12] (where
the DNLs are the abducibles) we come to the following definition of the Hypotheses set of a program.
Definition 18. Hypotheses set of a program. Let P be an NLP. We write Hyps(P ) to denote the set
of assumable hypotheses of P : the atoms that appear as DNLs in the bodies of rules of P˚ . Formally,
Hyps(P ) = {a : ∃r∈P˚not a ∈ body(r)}.
One can define a classical support compatible version of the Hypotheses set of a program, only using to
that effect the Remainder instead of the Layered Remainder. I.e.,
Definition 19. Classical Hypotheses set of a program. Let P be an NLP. We write CHyps(P ) to denote
the set of assumable hypotheses of P consistent with the classical notion of support: the atoms that appear
as DNLs in the bodies of rules of P̂ . Formally, CHyps(P ) = {a : ∃
r∈P̂not a ∈ body(r)}.
Here we take the layered support compatible approach and, therefore, we will use the Hypotheses set as
in definition 18. Since CHyps(P ) ⊆ Hyps(P ) for every NLP P , there is no generality loss in using
Hyps(P ) instead of CHyps(P ), while using Hyps(P ) allows for some useful semantics properties ex-
amined in the sequel.
4.2 Definition
Intuitively, a Minimal Hypotheses model of a program is obtained from a minimal set of hypotheses which
is sufficiently large to determine the truth-value of all literals via Remainder.
Definition 20. Minimal Hypotheses model. Let P be an NLP. Let Hyps(P ) be the set of assumable
hypotheses of P (cf. definition 18), and H some subset of Hyps(P ).
A 2-valued model M of P is a Minimal Hypotheses model of P iff
M+ = facts(P̂ ∪H) = heads(P̂ ∪H)
where H = ∅ or H is non-empty set-inclusion minimal (the set-inclusion minimality is considered only
for non-empty Hs). I.e., the hypotheses set H is minimal but sufficient to determine (via Remainder) the
truth-value of all literals in the program.
We already know that WFM+(P ) = facts(P̂ ) and that WFM+u(P ) = heads(P̂ ). Thus, whenever
facts(P̂ ) = heads(P̂ ) we have WFM+(P ) = WFM+u(P ) which means WFMu(P ) = ∅. Moreover,
whenever WFMu(P ) = ∅ we know, by Corollary 5.6 of [8], that the 2-valued model M such that M+ =
facts(P̂ ) is the unique stable model of P . Thus, we conclude that, as an alternative equivalent definition,
M is a Minimal Hypotheses model of P iff M is a stable model of P ∪ H where H is empty or a non-
empty set-inclusion minimal subset of Hyps(P ). Moreover, it follows immediately that every SM of P is
a Minimal Hypotheses model of P .
In example 2 we can thus see that we have the two models {beach,mountain,
not travel} and {travel, beach, not mountain}. This is the case because the addition of the fourth stub-
born friend does not change the set of Hyps(P ) which is based upon the Layered Remainder, and not on
the Remainder.
Example 3. Minimal Hypotheses models for the vacation with passport variation. Consider again the
vacation problem from example 1 with a variation including the need for valid passports for travelling P =
beach← not mountain
mountain← not travel
travel ← not beach, not expired_passport
passport_ok ← not expired_passport
expired_passport← not passport_ok
We haveP = P˚ = P̂ and thusHyps(P ) = {beach,mountain, travel, passport_ok, expired_passport}.
Let us see which are the MH models for this program.
H = ∅ does not yield a MH model.
Assuming H = {beach} we have P ∪H = P ∪ {beach} =
beach← not mountain
mountain← not travel
travel ← not beach, not expired_passport
beach
passport_ok ← not expired_passport
expired_passport← not passport_ok
and P̂ ∪H =
mountain
beach
passport_ok ← not expired_passport
expired_passport← not passport_ok
which means H = {beach} is not sufficient to determine the truth values of all literals of P . One can
easily see that the same happens for H = {mountain} and for H = {travel}: in either case the literals
passport_ok and expired_passport remain non-determined.
If we assume H = {expired_passport} then P ∪H is
beach← not mountain
mountain← not travel
travel ← not beach, not expired_passport
passport_ok ← not expired_passport
expired_passport← not passport_ok
expired_passport
and P̂ ∪H =
mountain
expired_passport
which means M+expired_passport = facts(P̂ ∪H) = heads(P̂ ∪H) = {mountain, expired_passport},
i.e.,
Mexpired_passport = {not beach,mountain, not travel, not passport_ok, expired_passport}, is a MH
model of P . Since assuming H = {expired_passport} alone is sufficient to determine all literals, there
is no other set of hypotheses H ′ of P such that H ′ ⊃ {expired_passport} (notice the strict ⊃, not ⊇),
yielding a MH model of P . E.g., H ′ = {travel, expired_passport} does not lead to a MH model of P
simply because H ′ is not minimal w.r.t. H = {expired_passport}.
If we assume H = {passport_ok} then P ∪H is
beach← not mountain
mountain← not travel
travel ← not beach, not expired_passport
passport_ok ← not expired_passport
expired_passport← not passport_ok
passport_ok
and P̂ ∪H =
beach← not mountain
mountain← not travel
travel ← not beach
passport_ok
which, apart from the fact passport_ok, corresponds to the original version of this example and still leaves
literals with non-determined truth-values. I.e., assuming the passports are OK allows for the three possibili-
ties of example 1 but it is not enough to entirely “solve” the vacation problem: we need some hypotheses set
containing one of beach, mountain, or travel if (in this case, and only if ) it also contains passport_ok.
Example 4. Minimality of Hypotheses does not guarantee minimality of model. Let P , with no SMs,
be
a← not b, c
b← not c, not a
c← not a, b
In this case P = P̂ = P˚ , which makes Hyps(P ) = {a, b, c}.
H = ∅ does not determine all literals of P because facts(P̂ ∪ ∅) = facts(P̂ ) = ∅ and heads(P̂ ∪ ∅) =
heads(P̂ ) = {a, b, c}.
H = {a} does determine all literals of P because facts(P̂ ∪ {a}) = {a} and heads(P̂ ∪ {a}) = {a},
thus yielding the MH model Ma such that M+a = facts(P̂ ∪ {a}) = {a}, i.e., Ma = {a, not b, not c}.
H = {c} is also a minimal set of hypotheses determining all literals because facts(P̂ ∪ {c}) = {a, c}
and heads(P̂ ∪ {c}) = {a, c}, thus yielding the MH model Mc of P such that M+c = facts(P̂ ∪ {c}) =
{a, c}, i.e., Mc = {a, not b, c}. However,Mc is not a minimal model of P because M+c = {a, c} is a strict
superset of M+a = {a}. Mc is indeed an MH model of P , but just not a minimal model thereby being a
clear example of how minimality of hypotheses does not entail minimality of consequences. Just to make
this example complete, we show that H = {b} also determines all literals of P because facts(P̂ ∪ {b}) =
{b, c} and heads(P̂ ∪ {b}) = {b, c}, thus yielding the MH model Mb such that M+b = facts(P̂ ∪ {b}) =
{b, c}, i.e., Mb = {not a, b, c}. Any other hypotheses set is necessarily a strict superset of either H = {a},
H = {b}, or H = {c} and, therefore, not set-inclusion minimal; i.e., there are no more MH models of P .
Also, not all minimal models of a program are MH models, as the following example shows.
Example 5. Some minimal models are not Minimal Hypotheses models. Let P (with no SMs) be
a← k
k ← not t
t← a, b
a← not b
b← not a
In this case P = P̂ = P˚ and thereforeHyps(P ) = {a, b, t}. Since facts(P̂ ) 6= heads(P̂ ), the hypotheses
set H = ∅ does not yield a MH model. Assuming H = {a} we have P̂ ∪H = P̂ ∪ {a} = {a ←
, k ←} so, P̂ ∪H is the set of facts {a, k} and, therefore, Ma such that M+a = facts(P̂ ∪H) =
facts(P̂ ∪ {a}) = {a, k}, is a MH model of P . Assuming H = {b} we have P̂ ∪ {b} =
a← k
k ← not t
t← a
b← not a
b
thus facts(P̂ ∪ {b}) = {b} 6= heads(P̂ ∪ {b}) = {a, b, t, k}, which means the set of hypotheses H =
{b} does not yield a MH model of P . Assuming H = {t} we have P̂ ∪ {t} =
t← a, b
b← not a
a← not b
t
thus facts(P̂ ∪ {t}) = {t} 6= heads(P̂ ∪ {t}) = {a, b, t}, which means the set of hypotheses H = {t}
does not yield a MH model of P .
Since we already know that H = {a} yields an MH model Ma with M+a = {a, k}, there is no point in
trying out any subset H ′ of Hyps(P ) = {a, b, t} such that a ∈ H ′ because any such subset would not
be minimal w.r.t. H = {a}. Let us, therefore, move on to the unique subset left: H = {b, t}. Assuming
H = {b, t} we have ̂P ∪ {b, t} = {t ← , b←} thus facts( ̂P ∪ {b, t}) = {b, t} = heads( ̂P ∪ {b, t}),
which means Mb,t such that M+b,t = facts(P̂ ∪H) = facts( ̂P ∪ {b, t}) = {b, t}, is a MH model of P .
It is important to remark that this program has other classical models, e.g, {a, k}, {b, t}, and {a, t}, but
only the first two are Minimal Hypotheses models — {a, t} is obtainable only via the set of hypotheses
{a, t} which is non-minimal w.r.t. H = {a} that yields the MH model {a, k}.
4.3 Properties
The minimality of H is not sufficient to ensure minimality of M+ = facts(P̂ ∪H) making its checking
explicitly necessary if that is so desired. Minimality of hypotheses is indeed the common practice is science,
not the minimality of their inevitable consequences. To the contrary, the more of these the better because it
signifies a greater predictive power.
In Logic Programming model minimality is a consequence of definitions: the T operator in definite
programs is conducive to defining a least fixed point, a unique minimal model semantics; in SM, though
there may be more than one model, minimality turns out to be a property because of the stability (and its
attendant classical support) requirement; in the WFS, again the existence of a least fixed point operator
affords a minimal (information) model. In abduction too, minimality of consequences is not a caveat, but
rather minimality of hypotheses is, if that even. Hence our approach to LP semantics via MHS is novel
indeed, and insisting instead on positive hypotheses establishes an improved and more general link to
abduction and argumentation [16, 17].
Theorem 1. At least one Minimal Hypotheses model of P complies with the Well-Founded Model. Let
P be an NLP. Then, there is at least one Minimal Hypotheses modelM of P such that M+ ⊇WFM+(P )
and M+ ⊆WFM+u(P ).
Proof. If facts(P̂ ) = heads(P̂ ) or equivalently, WFMu(P ) = ∅, then MH is a MH model of P given
that H = ∅ because M+H = facts(P̂ ∪H) = heads(P̂ ∪H) = facts(P̂ ∪ ∅) = heads(P̂ ∪ ∅) =
facts(P̂ ) = heads(P̂ ). On the other hand, if facts(P̂ ) 6= heads(P̂ ), then there is at least one non-empty
set-inclusion minimal set of hypothesesH ⊆ Hyps(P ) such that H ⊇ facts(P ). The correspondingMH
is, by definition, a MH model of P which is guaranteed to comply with M+H ⊇ WFM+(P ) = facts(P̂ )
and M−H ⊇ not WFM−(P ) = not (HP \M
+
H). ⊓⊔
Theorem 2. Minimal Hypotheses semantics guarantees model existence. Let P be an NLP. There is
always, at least, one Minimal Hypotheses model of P .
Proof. It is trivial to see that one can always find a set H ⊆ Hyps(P ) such that M+H′ = facts(P̂ ∪H ′) =
heads(P̂ ∪H ′) — in the extreme case, H ′ = Hyps(P ). From such H ′ one can always select a minimal
subset H ⊂ H such that M+H = facts(P̂ ∪H) = heads(P̂ ∪H) still holds. ⊓⊔
4.4 Relevance
Theorem 3. Minimal Hypotheses semantics enjoys Relevance. Let P be an NLP. Then, by definition 5,
it holds that
(∀M∈ModelsMH (P )a ∈M
+)⇔ (∀Ma∈ModelsMH (RelP (a))a ∈M
+
a )
Proof. ⇒: Assume ∀M∈ModelsMH (P )a ∈M+. Now we need to prove
∀Ma∈ModelsMH (RelP (a))a ∈M
+
a . Assume some Ma ∈ModelsMH(RelP (a)); now we show that assum-
ing a /∈ M+a leads to an absurdity. Since Ma is a 2-valued complete model of RelP (a) we know that
|Ma| = HRelP (a) hence, if a /∈ Ma, then necessarily not a ∈ M−a . Since P ⊇ RelP (a), by theorem 2
we know that there is some model M ′ of P such that M ′ ⊇Ma, and thus not a ∈M ′− which contradicts
the initial assumption that ∀M∈ModelsMH (P )a ∈ M+. We conclude a /∈ Ma cannot hold, i.e., a ∈ Ma
must hold. Since a ∈ M+ hold for every model M of P , then a ∈ Ma must hold for every model Ma of
RelP (a).
⇐: Assume ∀Ma∈ModelsMH (RelP (a))a ∈M+a . Now we need to prove
∀M∈ModelsMH (P )a ∈ M
+
. Let us write P)a( as an abbreviation of P \ RelP (a). We have therefore P =
P)a( ∪ RelP (a). Let us now take P)a( ∪ Ma. We know that every NLP as an MH model, hence every
MH model M of P)a( ∪Ma is such that M ⊇ Ma. Let HMa denote the Hypotheses set of Ma — i.e.,
M+a = facts(
̂RelP (a) ∪HMa) = heads(
̂RelP (a) ∪HMa), with HMa = ∅ or non-empty set-inclusion
minimal, as per definition 20. If facts( ̂P ∪HMa) = heads( ̂P ∪HMa) then M+ = facts( ̂P ∪HM ) =
heads( ̂P ∪HM ) is an MH model of P with HM = HMa and, necessarily, M ⊇Ma.
If facts( ̂P ∪HMa) 6= heads( ̂P ∪HMa) then, knowing that every program has a MH model, we can
always find an MH modelM of P)a(∪Ma, with H ′ ⊆ Hyps(P)a(∪Ma), whereM+ = facts(P̂ ∪H ′) =
heads(P̂ ∪H ′). Such M is thus M+ = facts( ̂P ∪HM ) = heads( ̂P ∪HM ) where HM = HMa ∪H ′,
which means M is a MH model of P with M ⊇ Ma. Since every model Ma of RelP (a) is such that
a ∈M+a , then every model M of P must also be such that a ∈M . ⊓⊔
4.5 Cumulativity
MH semantics enjoys Cumulativity thus allowing for lemma storing techniques to be used during compu-
tation of answers to queries.
Theorem 4. Minimal Hypotheses semantics enjoys Cumulativity. Let P be an NLP. Then
∀a,b∈HP
(
(∀M∈ModelsMH (P)a ∈M
+)⇒
(∀M∈ModelsMH (P)b ∈M
+ ⇔ ∀Ma∈ModelsMH (P∪{a})b ∈M
+
a )
)
Proof. Assume ∀ a∈HP
M∈ModelsMH (P)
a ∈M+.
⇒: Assume ∀M∈ModelsMH (P)b ∈ M+. Since every MH model M contains a it follows that all such
M are also MH models of P ∪ {a}. Since we assumed b ∈ M as well, and we know that M is a MH
model of P ∪ {a} we conclude b is also in those MH models M of P ∪ {a}. By adding a as a fact we
have necessarily Hyps(P ∪ {a}) ⊆ Hyps(P ) which means that there cannot be more MH models for
P ∪ {a} than for P . Since we already know that for every MH model M of P , M is also a MH model
of P ∪ {a} we must conclude that ∀M∈ModelsMH (P )∃1M ′∈ModelsMH (P∪{a}) such that M
′+ ⊇ M+. Since
∀M∈ModelsMH (P)b ∈M
+ we necessarily conclude ∀Ma∈ModelsMH (P∪{a})b ∈M+a .
⇐: Assume ∀Ma∈ModelsMH (P∪{a})b ∈M+a . Since the MH semantics is relevant (theorem 3) if b does
not depend on a then adding a as a fact to P or not has no impact on b’s truth-value, and if b ∈ M+a then
b ∈M+ as well. If b does depend on a, which is true in every MH model M of P , then either 1) b depends
positively on a, and in this case since a ∈ M then b ∈ M as well; or 2) b depends negatively on a, and in
this case the lack of a as a fact in P can only contribute, if at all, to make b true in M as well. Then we
conclude ∀M∈ModelsMH (P)b ∈M+. ⊓⊔
4.6 Complexity
The complexity issues usually relate to a particular set of tasks, namely: 1) knowing if the program has a
model; 2) if it has any model entailing some set of ground literals (a query); 3) if all models entail a set of
literals. In the case of MH semantics, the answer to the first question is an immediate “yes” because MH
semantics guarantees model existence for NLPs; the second and third questions correspond (respectively)
to Brave and Cautious Reasoning, which we now analyse.
Brave Reasoning The complexity of the Brave Reasoning task with MH semantics, i.e., finding an MH
model satisfying some particular set of literals is ΣP2 -complete.
Theorem 5. Brave Reasoning with MH semantics is ΣP2 -complete. Let P be an NLP, and Q a set of
literals, or query. Finding an MH model such that M ⊇ Q is a ΣP2 -complete task.
Proof. To show that finding a MH model M ⊇ Q is ΣP2 -complete, note that a nondeterministic Turing
machine with access to an NP-complete oracle can solve the problem as follows: nondeterministically guess
a set H of hypotheses (i.e., a subset of Hyps(P )). It remains to check if H is empty or non-empty minimal
such that M+ = facts(P̂ ∪H) = heads(P̂ ∪H) and M ⊇ Q. Checking that M+ = facts(P̂ ∪H) =
heads(P̂ ∪H) can be done in polynomial time (because computing P̂ ∪H can be done in polynomial time
[2] for whichever P ∪ H), and checking H is empty or non-empty minimal requires a nondeterministic
guess of a strict subset H ′ of H and then a polynomial check if facts(P̂ ∪H ′) = heads(P̂ ∪H ′). ⊓⊔
Cautious Reasoning Conversely, the Cautious Reasoning, i.e., guaranteeing that every MH model satisfies
some particular set of literals, is ΠP2 -complete.
Theorem 6. Cautious Reasoning with MH semantics is ΠP2 -complete. Let P be an NLP, and Q a set of
literals, or query. Guaranteeing that all MH models are such that M ⊇ Q is a ΠP2 -complete task.
Proof. Cautious Reasoning is the complement of Brave Reasoning, and since the latter is ΣP2 -complete
(theorem 5), the former must necessarily be ΠP2 -complete. ⊓⊔
The set of hypotheses Hyps(P ) is obtained from P˚ which identifies rules that depend on themselves.
The hypotheses are the atoms of DNLs of P˚ , i.e., the “atoms of nots in loop”. A Minimal Hypotheses model
is then obtained from a minimal set of these hypotheses sufficient to determine the 2-valued truth-value of
every literal in the program. The MH semantics imposes no ordering or preference between hypotheses —
only their set-inclusion minimality. For this reason, we can think of the choosing of a set of hypotheses
yielding a MH model as finding a minimal solution to a disjunction problem, where the disjuncts are the
hypotheses. In this sense, it is therefore understandable that the complexity of the reasoning tasks with MH
semantics is in line with that of, e.g., reasoning tasks with SM semantics with Disjunctive Logic Programs,
i.e, ΣP2 -complete and ΠP2 -complete.
In abductive reasoning (as well as in Belief Revision) one does not always require minimal solutions.
Likewise, taking a hypotheses assumption based semantic approach, like the one of MH, one may not
require minimality of assumed hypotheses. In such case, we would be under a non-Minimal Hypotheses
semantics, and the complexity classes of the corresponding reasoning task would be one level down in the
Polynomial Hierarchy relatively to the MH semantics, i.e., Brave Reasoning with a non-Minimal Hypothe-
ses semantics would be NP-complete, and Cautious Reasoning would be coNP-complete. We leave the
exploration of such possibilities for future work.
4.7 Comparisons
As we have seen all stable models are MH models. Since MH models are always guaranteed to exist for
every NLP (cf. theorem 2) and SMs are not, it follows immediately that the Minimal Hypotheses semantics
is a strict model conservative generalization of the Stable Models semantics. The MH models that are stable
models are exactly those in which all rules are classically supported. With this criterion one can conclude
whether some program does not have any stable models. For Normal Logic Programs, the Stable Models
semantics coincides with the Answer-Set semantics (which is a generalization of SMs to Extended Logic
Programs), where the latter is known (cf. [10]) to correspond to Reiter’s default logic. Hence, all Reiter’s
default extensions have a corresponding Minimal Hypotheses model. Also, since Moore’s expansions of
an autoepistemic theory [13] are known to have a one-to-one correspondence with the stable models of
the NLP version of the theory, we conclude that for every such expansion there is a matching Minimal
Hypotheses model for the same NLP.
Disjunctive Logic Programs (DisjLPs — allowing for disjunctions in the heads of rules) can be syn-
tactically transformed into NLPs by applying the Shifting Rule presented in [6] in all possible ways. By
non-deterministically applying such transformation in all possible ways, several SCCs of rules may appear
in the resulting NLP that were not present in the original DisjLP — assigning a meaning to every such
SCC is a distinctive feature of MH semantics, unlike other semantics such as the SMs. This way, the MH
semantics can be defined for DisjLPs as well: the MH models of a DisjLP are the MH models of the NLP
resulting from the transformation via Shifting Rule.
There are other kinds of disjunction, like the one in logic programs with ordered disjunction (LPOD)
[3]. These employ “a new connective called ordered disjunction. The new connective allows to represent
alternative, ranked options for problem solutions in the heads of rules”. As the author of [3] says “the
semantics of logic programs with ordered disjunction is based on a preference relation on answer sets.”
This is different from the semantics assigned by MH since the latter includes no ordering, nor preferences,
in the assumed minimal sets of hypotheses. E.g., in example 1 there is no notion of preference or ordering
amongst candidate models — LPODs would not be the appropriate formalism for such cases. We leave
for future work a thorough comparison of these approaches, namely comparing the semantics of LPODs
against the MH models of LPODs transformed into NLPs (via the Shifting Rule).
The motivation for [21] is similar to our own — to assign a semantics to every NLP — however their
approach is different from ours in the sense that the methods in [21] resort to contrapositive rules allowing
any positive literal in the head to be shifted (by negating it) to the body or any negative literal in the body
to be shifted to the head (by making it positive). This approach considers each rule as a disjunction making
no distinction between such literals occurring in the rule, whether or not they are in loop with the head of
the rule. This permits the shifting operations in [21] to create support for atoms that have no rules in the
original program. E.g.
Example 6. Nearly-Stable Models vs MH models. Take the program P =
a← not b
b← not c
c← not a, not x
According to the shifting operations in [21] this program could be transformed into P ′ =
b← not a
b← not c
x← not a, not c
by shifting a and not b in the first rule, and shifting the not x to the head (becoming positive x) and c
to the body (becoming negative not c) of the third rule thus allowing for {b, x} (which is a stable model
of P ′) to be a nearly stable model of P . In this sense the approach of [21] allows for the violation of the
Closed-World Assumption. This does not happen with our approach: {b, x} is not a Minimal Hypotheses
model simply because since x has no rules in P it cannot be true in any MH model — not x is not a
member of Hyps(P ) (cf. def. 18).
As shown in theorem 1, at least one MH model of a program complies with its well-founded model,
although not necessarily all MH models do. E.g., the program in Ex. 2 has the two MH models {beach,
mountain, not travel} and {beach, notmountain, travel}, whereas theWFM(P )imposesWFM+(P )
= {beach,mountain},WFMu(P ) = ∅, andWFM−(P ) = {travel}. This is due to the set of Hypothe-
ses Hyps(P ) of P being taken from P˚ (based on the layered support notion) instead of being taken from
P̂ (based on the classical notion of support).
Not all Minimal Hypotheses models are Minimal Models of a program. The rationale behind MH
semantics is minimality of hypotheses, but not necessarily minimality of consequences, the latter being
enforceable, if so desired, as an additional requirement, although at the expense of increased complexity.
The relation between logic programs and argumentation systems has been considered for a long time
now ([7] amongst many others) and we have also taken steps to understand and further that relationship
[16–18]. Dung’s Preferred Extensions [7] are maximal sets of negative hypotheses yielding consistent mod-
els. Preferred Extensions, however, these are not guaranteed to always yield 2-valued complete models. Our
previous approaches [16, 17] to argumentation have already addressed the issue of 2-valued model exis-
tence guarantee, and the MH semantics also solves that problem by virtue of positive, instead of negative,
hypotheses assumption.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Taking a positive hypotheses assumption approach we defined the 2-valued Minimal Hypotheses semantics
for NLPs that guarantees model existence, enjoys relevance and cumulativity, and is also a model conser-
vative generalization of the SM semantics. Also, by adopting positive hypotheses, we not only generalized
the argumentation based approach of [7], but the resulting MH semantics lends itself naturally to abductive
reasoning, it being understood as hypothesizing plausible reasons sufficient for justifying given observa-
tions or supporting desired goals. We also defined the layered support notion which generalizes the classical
one by recognizing the special role of loops.
For query answering, the MH semantics provides mainly three advantages over the SMs: 1) by enjoy-
ing Relevance top-down query-solving is possible, thereby circumventing whole model computation (and
grounding) which is unavoidable with SMs; 2) by considering only the relevant sub-part of the program
when answering a query it is possible to enact grounding of only those rules, if grounding is really desired,
whereas with SM semantics whole program grounding is, once again, inevitable — grounding is known
to be a major source of computational time consumption; MH semantics, by enjoying Relevance, permits
curbing this task to the minimum sufficient to answer a query; 3) by enjoying Cumulativity, as soon as the
truth-value of a literal is determined in a branch for the top query it can be stored in a table and its value
used to speed up the computations of other branches within the same top query.
Goal-driven abductive reasoning is elegantly modelled by top-down abductive-query-solving.By taking
a hypotheses assumption approach, enjoying Relevance, MH semantics caters well for this convenient
problem representation and reasoning category.
Many applications have been developed using the Stable Model/Answer-set semantics as the underlying
platform. These generally tend to be focused on solving problems that require complete knowledge, such as
search problems where all the knowledge represented is relevant to the solutions. However, as Knowledge
Bases increase in size and complexity, and as merging and updating of KBs becomes more and more
common, e.g. for Semantic Web applications, [11], partial knowledge problem solving importance grows,
as the need to ensure overall consistency of the merged/updated KBs.
The Minimal Hypotheses semantics is intended to, and can be used in all the applications where the
Stable Models/Answer-Sets semantics are themselves used to model KRR and search problems, plus all
applications where query answering (both under a credulous mode of reasoning and under a skeptical one)
is intented, plus all applications where abductive reasoning is needed. The MH semantics aims to be a
sound theoretical platform for 2-valued (possibly abductive) reasoning with logic programs.
Much work still remains to be done that can be rooted in this platform contribution. The general topics
of using non-normal logic programs (allowing for negation, default and/or explicit, in the heads of rules)
for Belief Revision, Updates, Preferences, etc., are per se orthogonal to the semantics issue, and therefore,
all these subjects can now be addressed with Minimal Hypotheses semantics as the underlying platform.
Importantly, MH can guarantee the liveness of updated and self-updating LP programs such as those of
EVOLP [1] and related applications. The Minimal Hypotheses semantics still has to be thoroughly com-
pared with Revised Stable Models [15], PStable Models [14], and other related semantics.
In summary, we have provided a fresh platform on which to re-examine ever present issues in Logic
Programming and its uses, which purports to provide a natural continuation and improvement of LP devel-
opment.
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